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FIRST AMENDMENT IN HIGHER
EDUCATION: WHEN INSTITUTIONAL
ACADEMIC FREEDOM COLLIDES WITH
STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS
CLAY CALVERT†
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a divided three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a student’s
expulsion from a public college’s nursing program in Keefe v.
Adams.1
In doing so, the majority rejected Craig Keefe’s
contention that Central Lakes College (“CLC”)2 violated his First
Amendment3 speech rights by punishing him for messages posted
on Facebook while off campus.4
In rebuffing Keefe, the majority declared it lawful for the
Minnesota college to enforce against him tenets of the American
Nurses Association’s (“ANA”)5 Code of Ethics.6
This code
†
Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director
of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida,
Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the
Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996,
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The author
thanks students Minch Minchin, Austin Vining, and Sebastian Zarate for their
background research that contributed to this Article.
1
840 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017).
2
Central Lakes College, part of the Minnesota State college and university
system, describes itself as “a comprehensive community and technical college
serving about 6,000 students per year.” General Information, CENTRAL LAKES
COLLEGE, http://www.clcmn.edu/general-information-2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
3
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were
incorporated more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government
entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
4
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 529–30.
5
The ANA calls itself:
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provides, in key part, that a “nurse treats colleagues, employees,
assistants, and students with respect and compassion. This
standard of conduct precludes any and all forms of prejudicial
actions, any form of harassment or threatening behavior, or
disregard for the effect of one’s actions on others.”7 It adds that a
“nurse maintains compassionate and caring relationships with
colleagues”8 and that “[i]n all encounters, nurses are responsible
for retaining their professional boundaries.”9
CLC incorporated ANA’s code into its nursing program.10 It
also determined a trio of Keefe’s Facebook posts violated the code
as “behavior unbecoming of the profession and [a] transgression
of professional boundaries.”11 Keefe, however, claimed he penned
the posts in Fall 2012 solely to vent frustrations while “working
full-time and studying for his nursing degree an additional 45–50
hours per week.”12 Two posts, set forth below in unaltered,
grammatically flawed form, expressed Keefe’s anger at a
classmate:
 “Glad group projects are group projects. I give her a big fat F
for changing the group power point at eleven last night and
resubmitting. Not enough whiskey to control that anger.”13
 “[Y]ou keep reporting my post and get me banded. I don’t
really care. If thats the smartest thing you can come up with
than I completely understand why your going to fail out of

[T]he premier organization representing the interests of the nation’s
3.6 million registered nurses. ANA advances the nursing profession by
fostering high standards of nursing practice, promoting a safe and ethical
work environment, bolstering the health and wellness of nurses, and
advocating on health care issues that affect nurses and the public. ANA is
at the forefront of improving the quality of health care for all.
About ANA, AMERICAN NURSES ASS’N, http://www.nursingworld.org/Functional
MenuCategories/AboutANA (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
6
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 529–31. See A MERICAN N URSES A SSOCIATION, C ODE OF
E THICS FOR N URSES (2015), http://nursingworld.org/DocumentVault/Ethics-1/Codeof-Ethics-for-Nurses.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
7
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 528 (emphasis added).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 529.
10
The handbook for CLC nursing students, which Keefe acknowledged
receiving, reviewing and understanding, required students “to uphold and adhere to”
ANA’s ethics code. Id. at 528.
11
Id.
12
James Eli Shiffer, Ex-Nursing Student Suffers Legal Setback over Facebook
Posts, STAR T RIB. (Nov. 6, 2016, 4:59 PM), http://www.startribune.com/ex-nursingstudent-suffers-legal-setback-over-facebook-posts/400132521.
13
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 526–27.
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the RN program you stupid bitch . . . . And quite creeping on
my page. Your not a friend of mine for a reason. If you don’t
like what I have to say than don’t come and ask me, thats
basically what creeping is isn’t it. Stay off my page . . . ”14

In a third missive, Keefe conveyed not merely rage but
possible violence, as he suggested giving “someone a
hemopneumothorax”15 and that he “might need some anger
management.”16 Keefe testified that “a hemopneumothorax is a
‘trauma’ where the lung is punctured and air and blood flood the
lung cavity; it is not a medical procedure.”17
In brief, Keefe’s disquieting off-campus, internet-posted
messages led to his expulsion because they were
“unprofessional”18 when viewed through the prism of ANA’s
ethics code. This outcome is profoundly problematic because an
ethics code of guiding aspirational principles suddenly takes on
binding legal force for students who have not achieved
professional status. Furthermore, the fact that the ethical
principles quoted above19 lack definitional precision, a flaw
typically exposing a statute to a void-for-vagueness challenge,20
was cursorily dismissed by the Eighth Circuit. The majority
simply reasoned that ANA’s “standards are necessarily quite
general, but they are widely recognized and followed”21 and
students such as Craig Keefe, in turn, “consent in writing to be
bound”22 by them. Put bluntly, Keefe signed away his First
Amendment rights.
But most troubling from a pro-free speech perspective, the
appellate court upheld the college student’s expulsion using a
test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Hazelwood

14

Id. at 527.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 527 n.3.
18
Id. at 531.
19
Supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
20
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (observing that “[i]t
is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined” such that they fail to “give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited . . . .”); see
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 987,
§ 11.2.2 (5th ed. 2015) (“A law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person
cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is permitted.”).
21
Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532.
22
Id.
15
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School District v. Kuhlmeier.23 That case examined censorship of
the on-campus speech of high school students occurring within
the curriculum. In particular, Hazelwood involved suppression of
two articles in a school-sponsored newspaper.24 The Court held
“that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”25
Over Judge Jane Kelly’s dissent, the two-judge Keefe
majority ripped Hazelwood from its school-sponsored, high-school
speech moorings and stretched it to college students authoring
decidedly independent, non-school-sponsored messages on their
own time while off campus.26 In doing so, the Eighth Circuit
fashioned a new rule. Quoting Hazelwood, this nascent standard
deems that “college administrators and educators in a
professional school have discretion to require compliance with
recognized standards of the profession, both on and off campus,
‘so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.’ ”27
The italicized passage from Hazelwood, melded into the
Keefe test, provides meager protection for student speech in high
schools, let alone colleges. Frank LoMonte, former executive
director of the Student Press Law Center, laments that the
Hazelwood rule is little more “than a deferentially reviewed
facsimile of reasonableness.”28 Similarly, attorney David Hudson

23

484 U.S. 260 (1988).
One of the censored articles related to the experiences with pregnancy of
students at the high school, while the other addressed “the impact of divorce on
students at the school.” Id. at 263.
25
Id. at 273.
26
Dissenting in Keefe on the free-speech issue, Judge Jane Kelly departed from
the majority by rejecting the application of Hazelwood. In doing so, she reasoned
that “Keefe’s speech was off-campus, was not school-sponsored, and cannot be
reasonably attributed to the school. Hazelwood’s ‘reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns’ test is therefore inapplicable in this case.” Keefe, 840 F.3d at
542 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Kelly added “[t]he fact that Keefe was a college student
also cautions against too lenient an interpretation of his First Amendment
protections.” Id. at 542 n.11.
27
Id. at 531 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
28
Frank D. LoMonte, “The Key Word Is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship
Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 F IRST A MEND. L. R EV. 305, 307 (2013).
24
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dubs Hazelwood a “deferential reasonableness standard[.]”29
Highlighting another problem, Professor Edward Carter and his
colleagues argue that Hazelwood’s “reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns”30 test “does not offer clear
parameters.”31
Perhaps most damningly, Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky asserts that “Hazelwood marks a shift to an
authoritarian approach to speech in schools,”32 with its test
amounting merely to “the classic phrasing of the rational basis
review.”33
Keefe, which the Supreme Court in April 2017 declined to
disturb,34 sadly extends what LoMonte decries as “an
increasingly common pattern in which colleges assert the
Hazelwood level of control over their students’ speech.”35 That
trend continues in 2017.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in March 2017 acknowledged that Hazelwood’s
“pedagogical concern standard is highly deferential.”36
Nonetheless, it enforced Hazelwood against a college student in a
graduate-level course, holding that “[t]eaching students to avoid
inflammatory language when writing for an academic audience
qualifies as a legitimate pedagogical goal.”37
Adding unfortunate insult and irony to Craig Keefe’s
situation, most appellate courts today38 examining the
29
DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., L ET THE STUDENTS SPEAK!: A HISTORY OF THE
F IGHT FOR F REE E XPRESSION IN A MERICAN SCHOOLS 100 (2011).
30
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
31
Edward L. Carter et al., Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum
Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. T EX. L. R EV .
157, 161 (2006).
32
Erwin Chemerinsky, Address, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The
Deference to Authority, 11 F IRST A MEND. L. R EV. 291, 292 (2013).
33
Id. at 294.
34
Keefe v. Adams, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017).
35
LoMonte, supra note 28, at 305.
36
Pompeo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 852 F.3d 973, 984 (10th Cir.
2017).
37
Id. at 989.
38
See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015)
(applying the Tinker standard to student speech posted on Facebook and YouTube
while off campus, and noting that “four other circuits have held that, under certain
circumstances, Tinker applies to speech which originated, and was disseminated, offcampus”); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011)
(applying Tinker to uphold punishment of a high school student for speech posted on
MySpace, and remarking that “other circuits have applied Tinker to such
circumstances”).
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punishment of high school students for off-campus, online
expression use a much more free-speech-protective standard than
Hazelwood. Specifically, they generally apply the material
disruption test from the Supreme Court’s 1969 seminal ruling in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.39
Tinker is considered by many scholars to be “the high point of
First Amendment freedom for students,”40 whereas Hazelwood
“was a resounding victory for school administrators[.]”41 In brief,
college student Craig Keefe was treated worse for his off-campus
speech by the Eighth Circuit, which applied Hazelwood, than
most federal appellate courts, applying the more rigorous Tinker
test, would treat high school students for similar Facebook posts.
Keefe’s attorney, Jordan Kushner, blasted the Eighth Circuit
for rendering “an extremely disturbing decision which could be
interpreted to allow college administrators to discipline or expel a
student for private conduct outside of class and campus under
the guise of professional standards.”42 Kushner claimed Craig
Keefe “basically had to give up on the medical profession”43 due to
CLC’s enforcement of the ANA’s professional standards.
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, two other appellate
courts—the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in 2015 in Oyama v. University of Hawaii44 and the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in 2012 in Tatro v. University of
Minnesota45—refused to embrace Hazelwood in cases involving
39

393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, which involved the on-campus speech rights of
high school and junior high school students, the Court held that school officials can
permissibly censor speech if there are actual facts that reasonably lead them “to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.” Id.
at 514. In brief, student speech can be safely stifled if officials believe it would
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” Id. at
513. Adding teeth to this test, the Court specified that an “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.” Id. at 508.
40
Mark Strasser, Tinker ReMorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and Parodies,
15 F IRST A MEND. L. R EV. 1, 2 (2016).
41
HUDSON, supra note 29, at 101.
42
Mike Mosedale, Nursing Student Loses Speech Fight, MINN. L AW. (Oct. 27,
2016), http://minnlawyer.com/2016/10/27/nursing-student-loses-speech-fight/.
43
Steven Nelson, Federal Court Upholds College Punishment for Off-Campus
Facebook Posts Said To Violate Vague Standards, U.S. N EWS & WORLD R EP. (Oct.
27, 2016, 12:25 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/federalcourt-upholds-college-punishment-for-off-campus-facebook-posts-said-to-violatevague-standards.
44
813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016).
45
816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012).
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college students held to professional standards. Yet in both
Oyama and Tatro, the appellate courts nonetheless upheld
enforcement of professional standards and rejected First
Amendment-based student speech claims.46
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the University
of Hawaii did not violate postbaccalaureate, education-certificate
student Mark Oyama’s speech rights when it denied his studentteacher application due largely to his comments about the
appropriateness of sexual relationships between adults and
children.47 Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Kim
Wardlaw rejected Hazelwood.48 Instead, she reasoned Oyama’s
rights were not infringed because the University’s “decision
related directly to defined and established professional
standards, was narrowly tailored to serve the University’s core
mission of evaluating Oyama’s suitability for teaching, and
reflected reasonable professional judgment.”49
Three years prior to Oyama, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in Tatro held that the University of Minnesota did not
trample on the First Amendment rights of an undergraduate
mortuary-science student when it disciplined her for several
Facebook posts.50 As in Oyama, the Minnesota high court
declined to adopt Hazelwood’s test.51 Instead, it held that “a
university may regulate student speech on Facebook that violates
established professional conduct standards,”52 provided the
restrictions are “narrowly tailored and directly related to
established professional conduct standards.”53
Despite deploying different tests, Keefe, Oyama, and Tatro
each involved what one commentator calls “a three-sided
relationship between universities, the professions, and the

46

See infra Part II (examining Oyama and Tatro in greater detail).
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856–58, 860–61.
48
In rejecting application of Hazelwood, Judge Wardlaw observed that “[i]n the
twenty-seven years since Hazelwood, we too have declined to apply its deferential
standard in the university setting.” Id. at 862.
49
Id. at 861.
50
The discipline included lowering student Amanda Tatro’s grade in one class
from a C+ to an F. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514–15, 524.
51
See id. at 518 (“[W]e decline to extend the legitimate pedagogical concerns
standard to a university’s imposition of disciplinary sanctions for a student’s
Facebook posts.”).
52
Id. at 521.
53
Id.
47
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students trained for those professions by universities.”54 In other
words, universities’ policies affecting speech in some academic
programs are determined by professions’ policies which, in turn,
are imposed on students seeking entry into those professions. If
a university tethers a speech-restricting policy to a profession’s
speech-restricting policy, this seemingly increases the odds of the
university’s policy passing constitutional muster in the face of a
lawsuit.
The probability of passing constitutional muster
increases due to deference courts extend in curricular matters
under the purview of institutional academic freedom.55 If a
university points to a professional standard for external
authority justifying a speech restriction, then that deference
seemingly escalates, with the professional standard legitimating
the university’s actions.56 This may be one reason why, as
Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea points out in a 2017 article,
“public colleges and universities are increasingly punishing
students for their speech when it is deemed inconsistent with
vague ‘professionalism’ standards.”57

54
William Bush, Note, What You Sign Up For: Public University Restrictions on
“Professional” Student Speech After Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 20 WASH. &
L EE J. C IVIL RTS . & SOC. JUST. 547, 553 (2014) (emphasis omitted).
55
See infra Part I (addressing institutional academic freedom).
56
In the absence of an external professional standard, public universities still
may permissibly regulate a student’s classroom-based speech in the interest of
serving a more general, if not nebulous, notion of workplace professionalism. For
instance, in Corlett v. Oakland University Board of Trustees, 958 F. Supp. 2d 795
(E.D. Mich. 2013), Judge Patrick Duggan rejected a First Amendment challenge
brought by a student disciplined for writings submitted in an English course at
Oakland University. Id. at 797. Among other things, the writings described the
course’s professor “as ‘stacked’ and graphically compared her to a sitcom character
he fetishized in a writing assignment.” Id. In rebuffing the student’s First
Amendment argument, Judge Duggan reasoned that “universities undoubtedly
retain some responsibility to teach students proper professional behavior, in other
words, to prepare students to behave and communicate properly in the workforce.”
Id. at 805 (emphasis added). He added that the university defendants “reasonably
could have found [the student’s] writings inappropriate from a student to a teacher
(as they certainly would have been from a teacher to a student) and punished him
accordingly.” Id. at 809.
57
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101
MINN. L. R EV. 1801, 1803 (2017).
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Using the decisions in Keefe, Oyama and Tatro as analytical
springboards,58 this Article examines rising tensions between
institutional academic freedom and the First Amendment speech
rights of college students. Specifically, the friction addressed
here occurs when universities enforce external professional
standards on students within their curricula. Initially, Part I
provides a primer on institutional academic freedom.59 Part II
then contrasts the vastly deferential Hazelwood approach to
professional-standards disputes embraced by the Eighth Circuit

58
Other appellate court rulings also directly involve professional standards
affecting the speech rights of public college and university students. See, e.g., Ward
v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (involving the alleged application of the
American Counseling Association’s (“ACA”) code of ethics to an Eastern Michigan
University student, Julea Ward, seeking a master’s degree in counseling; featuring
both First Amendment free expression and freedom of religion challenges to the
University’s expulsion of Ward after she, based on her Christian religious beliefs,
requested that a client seeking same-sex counseling be referred to another
counselor; and refusing to dismiss Ward’s lawsuit because, although the University
claimed it expelled her for violating the ACA’s ethics code by requesting a referral of
the client, “a reasonable jury could find otherwise—that the code of ethics contains
no such bar and that the university deployed it as a pretext for punishing Ward’s
religious views and speech”); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 876–77 (11th
Cir. 2011) (involving a Christian graduate student in the school counseling program
at Augustana State University (“ASU”) who believed that members of the gay,
lesbian, bisexual, transgender and queer/questioning (“GLBTQ”) community suffer
from identity confusion; upholding ASU’s right to enforce tenets of the ACA’s Code of
Ethics against the student in the face of the student’s claim that the code’s
imposition constituted viewpoint-based discrimination against her expressed beliefs
regarding members of the GLBTQ community; and applying the test used in the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood to hold “that ASU has a
legitimate pedagogical concern in teaching its students to comply with the ACA Code
of Ethics” and that the student “does not have a constitutional right to disregard the
limits ASU has established for its clinical practicum and set her own standards for
counseling clients in the clinical practicum”); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952, 954
(9th Cir. 2002) (upholding, under the United States Supreme Court’s test from
Hazelwood, “a pedagogically appropriate requirement that [a] thesis comply with
professional standards governing his discipline” and adding that the only act of the
University of California Santa Barbara officials in question “was a simple refusal to
approve the section because it did not meet academic and professional standards. As
a result, Plaintiff did not receive his degree earlier because he had not met the
requirements to receive it”) (emphasis added). Keefe and Oyama were selected here
due to their timeliness, while Tatro was chosen because it was the first appellate
court ruling involving Internet-posted, college-student expression running afoul of
such standards. Additionally, unlike cases such as Ward v. Polite noted earlier in
this footnote, Keefe, Oyama and Tatro involve pure free-speech claims rather than
ones entangling free speech and religion.
59
Infra notes 63–124 and accompanying text.
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in Keefe with the somewhat more rigorous ones adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Oyama and Minnesota’s Supreme Court in
Tatro.60
Part III then proposes and defends a more free-speechfriendly standard for cases involving public university students
who claim their First Amendment speech rights are impinged by
enforcement of professional standards of care.61 Finally, the
Article concludes in that the Supreme Court must quickly hear a
college-level, professional-standards case to definitively resolve
the proper test that lower courts should apply in these disputes.62
The Conclusion also emphasizes that drawing a legal distinction
between college programs that are supposedly professional—ones
preparing students for jobs requiring government certification or
that are bound by profession-specific statutes—and those that
are not is meritless. In brief, the same test proposed in Part III
should apply to any college-level degree program when
administrators cite an external professional standard of any kind
to squelch speech.
I.

INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM: CONTROLLING THE
CURRICULUM TAUGHT

Academic freedom is arguably “the defining characteristic of
a university.”63 The principle, however, remains nebulous more
than a century after the American Association of University
Professors issued a Declaration of Principles in 1915 that marked
“the first comprehensive analysis of academic freedom in the
United States.”64 Academic freedom, as one federal appellate
court encapsulated it, is an “ill-defined right”65 that does not exist
as “a separate right apart from the operation of the First
Amendment within the university setting.”66

60

Infra notes 125–251 and accompanying text.
Infra notes 252–304 and accompanying text.
62
Infra notes 305–325 and accompanying text.
63
MARJORIE HEINS , P RIESTS OF OUR DEMOCRACY: T HE SUPREME C OURT ,
A CADEMIC F REEDOM, AND THE A NTI -C OMMUNIST P URGE 23 (2013).
64
David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional”
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 L AW & C ONTEMP. P ROBS . 227,
232 (1990).
65
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1292 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004).
66
Id.
61
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The unsettled state of academic freedom, particularly as it
ties to the First Amendment, is widely recognized.67 Professor R.
George Wright, for example, asserts that “[a]cademic freedom is
largely unanalyzed, undefined, and unguided by principled
application, leading to its inconsistent and skeptical or
questioned invocation.”68 Professor Alan Chen concurs, noting
“the Supreme Court sporadically has made compelling
statements about the importance of academic freedom, yet, it has
been either unable or unwilling to develop a coherent framework
for assessing the scope of constitutional academic freedom
rights.”69 Such compelling statements are largely found in aging
cases like Sweezy v. New Hampshire70 and Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of the State University of New York71 and, albeit perhaps
somewhat less compellingly, in more recent ones such as Grutter
v. Bollinger.72

67
See, e.g., Larry D. Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value: The Quest To Safeguard
Academic Freedom, 34 J.C. & U.L. 111, 112 (2007) (“Scholars and judges disagree
about the very definition of ‘academic freedom,’ the extent of its coverage, and
whether it is entitled to judicial protection.”).
68
R. George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic Freedom, 85
NEB. L. R EV. 793, 794 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
69
Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of
the Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. C OLO. L. R EV. 955, 959 (2006).
70
354 U.S. 234 (1957). The Court in Sweezy reasoned that:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is
so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made.
Id. at 250.
71
385 U.S. 589 (1967). The Court in Keyishian opined:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom.
Id. at 603.
72
539 U.S. 306 (2003). The Court in Grutter wrote that “universities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition.” Id. at 329. It also recognized a
“tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits.” Id. at 328.
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One facet of academic freedom is institutional academic
freedom. Compared with individual academic freedom, which
focuses on “the freedom of the individual faculty member,”73
institutional academic freedom centers on “the freedom of a
college or university to pursue its mission”74 and “to make
decisions that it believes best further that mission.”75 This
encompasses “the freedom to determine what may be taught[]
[and] the freedom to determine how the subject matter will be
taught . . . .”76 As Justice Lewis Powell wrote nearly forty years
ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,77 “[t]he
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes,”78 among other things, the freedom to
determine “what may be taught[] [and] how it shall be
taught . . . .”79
This language regarding freedom over what to teach and
how to teach it springs from a passage in The Open Universities
in South Africa and Academic Freedom80 that Justice Felix
Frankfurter famously quoted in Sweezy:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail “the four
essential freedoms” of a university—to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.81

Justice David Souter reemphasized these principles in 2000,
remarking that “[o]ur understanding of academic freedom has
included not merely liberty from restraints on thought,
73
James D. Gordon III, Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom at
Religious Colleges and Universities, 30 J.C. & U.L. 1, 1 (2003).
74
Id. at 2.
75
Id. at 6.
76
WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & B ARBARA A. L EE, T HE L AW OF HIGHER E DUCATION
§ 6.1.7, at 296 (5th ed., Student Version 2014).
77
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
78
Id. at 312.
79
Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
80
See Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic
Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. & U.L.
35, 46–57 (2002) (providing an excellent review of the background, history, and
content of this book).
81
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(quoting T HE OPEN U NIVERSITIES IN SOUTH A FRICA AND A CADEMIC F REEDOM
10–12 (1957)).
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expression, and association in the academy, but also the idea that
universities and schools should have the freedom to make
decisions about how and what to teach.”82 Writing on the Court’s
opinion fifteen years earlier in Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing,83 Professor Larry Spurgeon calls Stevens’
statement “a bow to the tradition of deference to the academic
community.”84
Indeed, the autonomy imbuing institutional academic
freedom85 is sometimes accompanied by a healthy dose of judicial
deference. For example, in delivering the Court’s opinion in
Grutter, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor observed a “tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits.”86 Erica Goldberg and
Kelly Sarabyn argue that O’Connor’s sentiment “bolstered the
institutional view of academic freedom.”87
In addressing race as a law-school-admissions factor in
Grutter, O’Connor reinforced the importance of deference,
remarking that “[t]he Law School’s educational judgment that
such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer.”88 She added that, in scrutinizing the admissions
policy, the Court accounted for the fact that “complex educational
judgments”89 on issues such as admissions fall “primarily within
the expertise of the university.”90

82
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 (2000)
(Souter, J., concurring).
83
474 U.S. 214 (1985).
84
Spurgeon, supra note 67, at 159.
85
See Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (“And we must not ignore the interest of colleges and universities in
institutional autonomy.”); see also Owen Fiss, The Democratic Mission of the
University, 76 A LB. L. R EV. 735, 739 (2012/13) (“One branch of the principle of
academic freedom . . . confers upon the university a measure of autonomy from
government regulation. It is based on the epistemological premise that such
autonomy is most conducive to the attainment of knowledge and the truth that it
necessarily implies.”) (internal citation omitted).
86
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
87
Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of Deference”:
Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA C LARA L. R EV .
217, 220 (2011).
88
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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One interpretation of Grutter, Professor Paul Horwitz
asserts, is that it “provides First Amendment support for a strong
principle of institutional autonomy for academic institutions.”91
This reading, he adds, “focuses on institutional deference . . . .”92
The foundational premise underlying such autonomy and
deference, Professor Neal Katyal explains, is the Court’s
recognition that universities “are better at making choices about
educational matters than are generalist courts.”93
Katyal
elaborates that Grutter’s discussion of academic freedom “was
built on a recognition of the First Amendment concerns of
government intrusion into higher education, coupled with a
healthy skepticism about the ability of generalist federal courts
to make decisions for a university with respect to learning.”94
Justice Anthony Kennedy reiterated Grutter’s strong sense of
deference to educational institutions in 2016 when delivering the
majority opinion in the admissions-criteria case of Fisher v.
University of Texas.95 “Considerable deference is owed to a
university in defining those intangible characteristics, like
student body diversity, that are central to its identity and
educational mission,” Kennedy opined.96
Deference sometimes is palpable in professional-standards
cases like those at the heart of this Article. For example, in
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley97 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit in 2011 upheld a public university
imposing the American Counseling Association’s (“ACA”) Code of
Ethics on a graduate student in a school-counseling program.
Rejecting the student’s free-speech arguments against the code’s
usage, the appellate court reasoned that the university’s decision
to make students adhere to it was “subject to significant
deference, not exacting constitutional scrutiny.”98 As Judge
William Pryor explained in Keeton, “we may not act as ‘ersatz
deans or educators’ by second-guessing regular academic

91

Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. R EV. 461, 467 (2005).
Id. at 556–57.
93
Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Precondition of Educational Autonomy,
31 HASTINGS C ONST. L.Q. 557, 557 (2003).
94
Id. at 563.
95
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016).
96
Id. at 2214.
97
664 F.3d 865, 880 (11th Cir. 2011).
98
Id. at 879.
92
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methods of a public university.”99 He added that “[i]n matters of
instruction and academic programs, federal judges must instead
exercise restraint.”100
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Urofsky v. Gilmore101 privileged institutional academic
freedom above that of individual faculty. The Fourth Circuit
opined “that to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right
of ‘academic freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment
rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the
University, not in individual professors . . . .”102 It elaborated
that “[t]he Supreme Court, to the extent it has constitutionalized
a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized
only an institutional right of self-governance in academic
affairs.”103 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit cited Urofsky approvingly in 2005,104 thereby reinforcing
the significance of institutional academic freedom.
Professor Larry Spurgeon argues that rather than
constituting a right, institutional academic freedom is more akin
to “a qualified immunity based upon the long tradition of
deference to the academic community.”105 Regardless of whether
this is correct, the concept of institutional academic freedom
provides theoretical footing for universities to enforce external
professional standards in their curricula and certification
processes. Indeed, if a public university’s decision to enforce a
policy prohibiting possession of concealed weapons on campus—
something with no bearing on the curriculum—falls within the
scope of its “First Amendment right of academic freedom,”106 then
surely so does implementation of professional standards of care
and conduct, either as part of the curriculum or a certification
process for students.

99
Id. at 883 (Pryor, J., concurring) (quoting Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066,
1075 (11th Cir. 1991)).
100
Id.
101
216 F.3d 401, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2000).
102
Id. at 410.
103
Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
104
Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing
Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410.
105
Spurgeon, supra note 67, at 164.
106
Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1276 (D. Utah 2003).
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In addition to Keefe v. Adams addressed above,107 the cases
examined in the next Part demonstrate how institutional
academic freedom over degree programs collides with the First
Amendment speech rights of students in public colleges and
universities108 when those institutions impose professional
standards affecting free expression. The conflict arises because
the Supreme Court recognizes that a public university “must
provide some protection to its students’ First Amendment
interests”109 and that such institutions operate “against a
background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at
the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”110 It is
particularly troubling when professional standards are used to
quash student speech that offends. That is because the Court
recognizes that “the mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how
offensive to good taste—on a state university campus may not be
shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’ ”111
But what if the rationale for censorship is not merely to
maintain conventions of decency, but instead to uphold
professional standards of care applicable in a student’s
prospective field of employment? The difficulty in answering this
query and, in turn, reconciling the tension between institutional
academic freedom and student First Amendment rights is
exacerbated in cases like Keefe because the scope of speech rights
in public university settings remains—much like the concept of
academic freedom—unfortunately murky112 and ambiguous.113
107

See supra Introduction.
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (observing that “state colleges
and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment”).
See generally Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal
Circuit Split over College Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 T EX. J. C.L. & C.R.
27 (2008) (providing an overview of the still-unsettled state of the First Amendment
rights of public college and university students).
109
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233
(2000).
110
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835
(1995).
111
Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973).
112
See Michael K. Park, Restricting Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality
of Regulating Students’ Off-Campus Online Speech in the Age of Social Media, 52
WILLAMETTE L. R EV. 405, 431 (2016) (describing a “murky picture of free speech
jurisprudence on college campuses”).
113
The problem here arises partly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to
squarely address the issue. In its decision of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988), affecting the First Amendment speech rights of high school
students in school-sponsored fora, the majority observed that “[w]e need not now
108
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The Supreme Court has never directly addressed a case, such as
Keefe, involving “whether universities can regulate off-campus,
online speech by students.”114
While the Supreme Court acknowledges that the “college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas,’ ”115 a truly egalitarian, anything-goes
marketplace of ideas may clash with academic freedom. This is
especially true, former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post
explains, for “academic freedom of research and inquiry.”116
Specifically, Post asserts that “[u]niversities are essential
institutions for the creation of disciplinary knowledge, and such
knowledge is produced by discriminating between good and bad
ideas. It follows that academic freedom cannot usefully be
conceptualized as a marketplace of ideas.”117 Put differently, in
universities “[c]ompetence is defined by reference to scholarly or
disciplinary standards. These standards cannot be determined
by reference to public opinion.”118 All ideas in academia, in other
words, are not equally deserving of protection.119
The constitutional value of academic freedom, Post thus
contends, requires deference to “professional scholarly
standards”120 to create expert knowledge and to determine
competence of untenured faculty.121
By extension, when
universities impose professional standards on students to help
determine their disciplinary competence upon possible
graduation, it is not surprising that such exercises of
decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to schoolsponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.” Id. at 273 n.7.
114
Yeasin v. Durham, 224 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1202 (D. Kan. 2016).
115
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of State Univ. N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
116
R OBERT C. P OST, DEMOCRACY, E XPERTISE, AND A CADEMIC F REEDOM : A
F IRST A MENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN S TATE 72 (2012).
117
Id. at 62.
118
Id. at 67.
119
See Joseph J. Martins, Tipping the Pickering Balance: A Proposal for
Heightened First Amendment Protection for the Teaching and Scholarship of Public
University Professors, 25 C ORNELL J.L. & P UB. P OL’Y 649, 682 (2016) (“Indeed, it is
the academy’s essence to distinguish ‘worthy ideas’ from ‘dull’ ones and, necessarily,
to value some speakers more than others.”).
120
P OST, supra note 116, at 78. Post adds that “[t]he constitutional value of
academic freedom depends upon the exercise of professional standards . . . .” Id. at
80.
121
As Post notes, untenured faculty “are closely scrutinized for competence,”
while tenured faculty “are awarded a generous presumption of competence to
facilitate the academic freedom necessary for creating new knowledge.” Id. at 73.
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institutional academic freedom inhibit a completely unfettered
marketplace of ideas. Professional standards designed to ensure
competence, whether imposed on faculty or students, inevitably
conflict with an any-idea-goes marketplace.
With this background on institutional academic freedom in
mind, the next Part explores in greater detail the professionalcode, student-speech cases of Tatro v. University of Minnesota122
and Oyama v. University of Hawaii123 noted in the
Introduction.124
II. DIGGING DEEPER INTO THE PROFESSIONAL-STANDARDS,
STUDENT-SPEECH MUDDLE: CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HAZELWOOD STANDARD
This Part has two sections.
Section A
Supreme Court of Minnesota’s decision in Tatro
Minnesota, while Section B analyzes the United
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Oyama
Hawaii.
A.

addresses the
v. University of
States Court of
v. University of

Tatro v. University of Minnesota

As with Craig Keefe, Amanda Tatro’s troubles at her
institution stemmed from a series of Facebook posts ostensibly
written to release and relieve emotional frustrations.125 An
undergraduate studying mortuary science at the University of
Minnesota, Tatro took an anatomy laboratory course in which
she dissected a human cadaver she humorously named Bernie,126
based on the 1989 comedy film Weekend at Bernie’s.127 Taking to
122

816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016).
124
See supra notes 44–53 and accompanying text (discussing Oyama and Tatro).
125
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 511–13.
126
Id. at 512–13.
127
See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011),
aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012) (“ ‘Bernie’ was the name Tatro gave to the
cadaver/donor she was assigned to work on, and is derived from the film Weekend at
Bernie’s.”); see also Mike Clark, Lifeless ‘Bernie’ is Beyond Revival, USA TODAY, July
6, 1989 (describing Weekend at Bernie’s as “a one-joke movie about a ubiquitous
stiff”—namely, a corpse named Bernie whom characters played by Andrew
McCarthy and Jonathan Silverman try to make seem alive and “whose body keeps
popping up everywhere”); Stephen Holden, Spoofing Hamptons Life with a Mobster
Murder, N.Y. T IMES (July 5, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/05/
movies/review-film-spoofing-hamptons-life-with-a-mobster-murder.html (reviewing
Weekend at Bernie’s, describing the plot in which Andrew McCarthy and Jonathan
123
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Facebook to vent about a relationship breakup128 and to
cathartically engage129 in what she alleged was “satirical
commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience,”130
Tatro made her corpse, Bernie, both the butt of jokes and the
target of fictional violence. To wit, the content of Tatro’s four
contested posts consisted of:
 “Get[ting] to play, I mean dissect, Bernie today. Let’s see if I
can have a lab void of reprimanding and having my scalpel
taken away. Perhaps if I just hide it in my sleeve . . . .”131
 “[L]ooking forward to Monday’s embalming therapy as well
as a rumored opportunity to aspirate. Give me room, lots of
aggression to be taken out with a trocar.”132
 “Who knew embalming lab was so cathartic! I still want to
stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar though.
Hmm . . . perhaps I will spend the evening updating my
‘Death List #5’ and making friends with the crematory guy. I
do know the code[.]”133
 “Realized with great sadness that my best friend, Bernie, will
no longer be with me as of Friday next week. I wish to
accompany him to the retort. Now where will I go or who
will I hang with when I need to gather my sanity? Bye, bye
Bernie. Lock of hair in my pocket.”134

Tatro’s self-described “sarcasm [and] morbid sense of
humor”135 in these posts contravened a Minnesota statute
governing morticians and others involved in the business or

Silverman’s characters attempt to make a corpse named Bernie “appear to be alive,”
and noting that one effort to make Bernie seem alive at his Hamptons home is “to
put sunglasses on him, wheel him out to the sun deck of his house and rig a device
that raises an arm so he appears to be waving groggily to passers-by on the beach.”).
128
Abby Simons, State Justices Uphold Penalty for U Student, STAR T RIB., June
21, 2012.
129
Amanda Tatro explained during a disciplinary hearing held by the Campus
Committee on Student Behavior:
[T]hat she uses humor and jokes to release anxiety and to stave off
depression due to her unique life circumstances. Tatro suffers from a
debilitating central nervous system disease, and she has served as the
primary caretaker for her mother, who suffers from the effects of a
traumatic brain injury.
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514.
130
Id. at 511.
131
Id. at 512.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 512–13.
135
Id. at 514.
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practice of mortuary science.136 Specifically, that statute forbids
“unprofessional conduct,”137 including failure “to treat with
dignity and respect the body of the deceased.”138 As interpreted
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, this means that “dignity and
respect for the human cadaver constitutes an established
professional
conduct
standard
for
mortuary
science
professionals.”139
But if Tatro was merely a student and not yet a professional,
how and why did this standard apply to her? Because among the
academic program rules for mortuary science that Tatro signed
was one echoing this statutory language. Specifically, that rule
required students to treat human cadavers “with utmost respect
and dignity.”140 Additionally, the laboratory rules Tatro agreed to
follow provide “that ‘[c]onversational language of cadaver
dissection outside the laboratory should be respectful and
discreet’ and that ‘[b]logging about the anatomy lab or the
cadaver dissection is not allowable.’ ”141 In brief, the University
of Minnesota tethered its own policies affecting the speech of
students in the mortuary science program to a state statute142
governing mortuary professionals in the Gopher State.
The University ultimately disciplined Tatro for her
“disrespectful and unprofessional”143 Facebook posts by, among
other things, reducing her C+ mark in the anatomy laboratory
course to a failing grade.144 Tatro countered in her lawsuit “that
the University violated her constitutional rights to free speech by
disciplining her for Facebook posts.”145

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

MINN. STAT. A NN. § 149A.70 (West 2017).
Id.
Id.
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 522.
Id. at 516.
Id.
See MINN. STAT. A NN. § 149A.70 (West 2017).
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 517.
Id. at 513–15.
Id. at 511.
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In deciding whether the University flouted Tatro’s First
Amendment speech rights,146 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
initially noted it faced an issue of first impression with no
established legal test.147 Attempting to fill this legal lacuna, the
University of Minnesota argued that Hazelwood provided the
correct standard.148 Tatro responded “that public university
students are entitled to the same free speech rights as members
of the general public with regard to Facebook posts.”149 Her
position equating “the free speech rights of university students
with those of the general public”150 would have safeguarded
Tatro’s Facebook missives unless their content fell within one of
the few categories of speech not protected by the First
Amendment.151
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, rejected the
standards proposed by both the University of Minnesota and
Amanda Tatro. In their place, the Court fashioned its own rule:
“[A] university may regulate student speech on Facebook that
violates established professional conduct standards,”152 provided

146
Although Tatro alleged violations of her free speech rights under both the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the
Minnesota Constitution, the Supreme Court of Minnesota looked “primarily to
federal law for guidance” because the federal and state provisions are coextensive.
Id. at 515–16.
147
See id. at 517 (“The factual situation presented by this appeal has not been
addressed in any published court decision—a university’s imposition of disciplinary
sanctions for a student’s Facebook posts that violated academic program rules.
Consequently, the constitutional standard that applies in this context is unsettled.”).
148
See id. at 518 (“[T]he University argues that it may constitutionally enforce
academic program rules that are ‘reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical
objective of training Mortuary Science students to enter the funeral director
profession,’ even when those rules extend to off-campus conduct.”).
149
Id. at 517.
150
Id. at 520–21.
151
The U.S. Supreme Court has carved out several varieties of unprotected
expression. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (identifying
categories of unprotected expression as incitement to violence, obscenity,
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography,
fraud, true threats and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the
government has the power to prevent”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234,
245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography
produced with real children.”).
152
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521.
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the restrictions on a student’s posts are “narrowly tailored and
directly related to established professional conduct standards.”153
Defending this test, the Court reasoned that:
Tying the legal rule to established professional conduct
standards limits a university’s restrictions on Facebook use to
students in professional programs and other disciplines where
student conduct is governed by established professional conduct
standards. And by requiring that the restrictions be narrowly
tailored and directly related to established professional conduct
standards, we limit the potential for a university to create
overbroad restrictions that would impermissibly reach into a
university student’s personal life outside of and unrelated to the
program.154

Professor R. George Wright criticizes this test as “a highly
deferential form of mere minimum scrutiny.”155 That is in part
because, Wright asserts, “the weight, proven or speculative, of
the school’s interest in restricting the student’s speech appears to
be of limited constitutional significance.”156 Instead of mandating
that a particular level of importance be assigned to a professional
standard before its speech-squelching imposition is justified, the
Tatro test suggests “all binding professional standards are in this
crucial respect created equal.”157
Furthermore, Wright points out that the Tatro test ignores
traditional First Amendment concerns about viewpoint-based
censorship158 and, instead, “assume[s] that the regulations in
question target not speech viewpoints, but the student’s failure to
follow specified established professional conduct norms.”159
Indeed, the professional standard at issue in Tatro—treating a
corpse with “dignity and respect”160—is indubitably viewpoint153

Id.
Id.
155
R. George Wright, Standards of Professional Conduct as Limitations on
Student Speech, 11 F IRST A MEND. L. R EV. 426, 428 (2013).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2014) (“The First Amendment, our
precedent makes plain, disfavors viewpoint-based discrimination.”); see also Martin
H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. K Y. L. R EV. 553, 579–80
(1997) (“If there is one unbending principle of First Amendment theory and doctrine,
it is that government may not shut off one side of a political debate because of
disagreement with the position sought to be expressed.”).
159
Wright, supra note 155, at 429.
160
MINN. STAT. A NN § 149A.70 (West 2017).
154
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centric. That’s because one is only permitted to engage in
respectful speech about cadavers.
Conversely, disrespectful
speech of the kind Amanda Tatro used is subject to censorship
and punishment.
In a different article, Professor Wright criticizes the narrow
tailoring facet of the Tatro test.161
“The narrow tailoring
requirement, importantly, can easily be interpreted with varying
degrees of rigor,” he asserts.162
In stark contrast to the 2016 decision by the Eighth Circuit
in Keefe, the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected the Hazelwood
test.163 In doing so, it deemed Hazelwood inapplicable for several
reasons.
First, Amanda Tatro’s Facebook posts were not
sponsored by, and did not carry the imprimatur of, the
University.164 Second, the Court was concerned that the phrase
“legitimate pedagogical concerns”165—the heart of Hazelwood’s
test—was so malleable and elastic that it easily could be
stretched to sweep up vague values such as courtesy and respect
for authority.166 Additionally, the Court intimated that the wide
latitude for censorship provided by Hazelwood might be abused
by universities to censor Internet-based speech that was merely
“offensive or controversial.”167
In applying its three-pronged test—first determining what
the “established professional conduct standards”168 are, and then
deciding if the academic program rules at issue are both
“narrowly tailored and directly related to”169 those standards—
the Supreme Court of Minnesota touched on institutional
academic freedom, addressed earlier in this Article.170
Specifically, the Court considered the deference owed to
universities when fashioning a curriculum, opining that:
Although “a university’s interest in academic freedom” does not
“immunize the university altogether from First Amendment
challenges,” courts have concluded that a university “has

161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 9 (2014).
Id.
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012).
Id.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id.
See supra Part I (discussing institutional academic freedom).

FINAL_CALVERT

634

3/25/2018 5:55 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:611

discretion to engage in its own expressive activity of prescribing
its curriculum” and that it is appropriate to “defer[] to the
university’s expertise in defining academic standards and
teaching students to meet them.”171

This deferential genuflection to institutional academic
freedom proved pivotal, with the Court noting that by “[g]iving
deference to the curriculum decisions of the University, we
conclude that the academic program rules imposed on Tatro as a
condition of her access to human cadavers are directly related to
established professional conduct standards.”172 The rules were
also narrowly tailored, according to Minnesota’s high court,
because they:
[A]llow “respectful and discreet” conversational language of
cadaver dissection outside the laboratory, but prohibit blogging
about cadaver dissection or the anatomy lab. In this case, the
University is not sanctioning Tatro for a private conversation,
but for Facebook posts that could be viewed by thousands of
Facebook users and for sharing the Facebook posts with the
news media.173

This logic suggests that the size of the audience to which a
student’s message is disseminated affects its protectability.
Specifically, there is an inverse relationship—the larger the size
of the audience, the smaller the chances are that the speech is
protected by the First Amendment. Tatro clearly harmed her
own case under this logic. That is because, after initially
believing she was suspended from the program, she brought
added attention to her situation—and to her posts—by seeking
out local news organizations to cover her dispute.174 In fact, she
“appeared on local television stations.”175 This move backfired for
Tatro, as it sparked a wave of public backlash against her.176
Two other items proved important for the Supreme Court of
Minnesota: the University’s contention that Tatro’s speech
jeopardized the entire future of the mortuary science program
and the rather lenient punishment Tatro suffered. As to the first
point, the Court wrote that “the publicity surrounding Tatro’s
171
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 522 (quoting Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950, 952 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
172
Id. at 522–23.
173
Id. at 523.
174
Id. at 513.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 523.
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posts resulted in letters and calls to the Anatomy Bequest
Program from donor families and the public regarding Tatro’s
poor judgment and lack of professionalism.”177 This, in turn,
could have jeopardized the pipeline of dead bodies upon which
the mortuary science program depends.178 The program, in brief,
would collapse without cadavers to sustain it.
As for the second point—the relative leniency of discipline—
the Court reasoned that “Tatro was not expelled or even
suspended from the Mortuary Science Program. The University
allowed Tatro to continue in the Mortuary Science Program with
a failing grade in one laboratory course.”179 This suggests that
the severity—or lack thereof—of the sanction imposed for
breaching an academic program rule premised on a professional
standard is relevant in determining the constitutionality of a
university’s action. In layman’s terms, whether the punishment
fits the supposed crime may affect a student’s First Amendment
challenge.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Minnesota intimated that the
result in Tatro might be a rare occurrence, given the somewhat
unusual traits of a mortuary science academic program. Here,
the Court explained that its holding was:
[B]ased on the specific circumstances of this case—a
professional program that operates under established
professional conduct standards, a program that gives students
access to donated human cadavers and requires a high degree of
sensitivity, written academic program rules requiring the
respectful treatment of human cadavers, and measured
discipline that was not arbitrary or a pretext for punishing the
student’s protected views.180

Perhaps, then, the outcome in Tatro is an outlier. How many
other academic programs, after all, depend on a steady supply of
donated dead bodies and, by extension, the kindness and concern
177

Id.
On this point, the Court reasoned:
[T]here would not be a Mortuary Science Program if people were not willing
to donate their bodies after death to the Anatomy Bequest Program.
Further, the consequences of any violation of trust caused by a student in
the Mortuary Science Program would extend far beyond the Mortuary
Science Program to other University programs that rely on donated human
cadavers for their research and education missions.
Id. at 523–24.
179
Id. at 524.
180
Id.
178
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of surviving relatives of the deceased? There are likely very few,
other than those involving clinical anatomy dissection courses in
programs such as physiology and medicine.
But a larger unanswered question raised by the passage
quoted above is precisely what constitutes—in the parlance of
Minnesota’s high court—“a professional program”?181 As this
Article’s Conclusion explains,182 drawing a bright line between
professional and nonprofessional programs is challenging. An
undergraduate program in English, for example, might not
appear to be professional, but for an English major hoping to
teach English upon graduation it provides requisite professional
knowledge.
Professor Emily Gold Waldman calls Tatro “a paradigmatic
certification case”183 because the University of Minnesota’s
“educational concerns were inextricably linked to certification
concerns.”184 That is because “by allowing Tatro to continue in
the Mortuary Science Program, the University of Minnesota
would be facilitating her entry into the profession and essentially
certifying her fitness for it.”185
Although Amanda Tatro’s
Facebook posts did not bear the imprimatur of the University
and thus were not governed by Hazelwood, “by ultimately
granting Tatro a degree from the Mortuary Science Program, the
University would have been placing its imprimatur on her as an
appropriate entrant into this profession.”186
In a tragic coda, Amanda Tatro, who ultimately graduated
from the mortuary science program, died at age thirty-one in
Minneapolis just a few days after the Supreme Court of
Minnesota ruled against her.187 She was employed at a funeral
home when she died.188 Tatro had wanted to appeal her case to
the United States Supreme Court, according to her attorney
Jordan Kushner,189 who later represented Craig Keefe.190 Her

181

Id.
See infra Conclusion and accompanying text.
183
Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs On Student Speech: The
Certification Cases, 11 F IRST A MEND. L. R EV. 382, 392 (2013).
184
Id. (emphasis omitted).
185
Id. at 393.
186
Id. (emphasis omitted).
187
Abby Simons, U Grad in Facebook Case Dies, STAR T RIB. (June 26, 2012,
10:59 PM), http://www.startribune.com/u-grad-in-facebook-case-dies/160401465.
188
Id.
189
Id.
182
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desire to keep fighting was unsurprising. As Joel Rand, Tatro’s
husband, told one reporter shortly after her death, “if she was
wronged or perceived that she had been wronged, she would fight
tooth-and-nail.”191
Kushner, drawing a key distinction between private-time
speech and workplace conduct, criticized the Supreme Court of
Minnesota’s reliance on professional standards:
The standard they cited was about showing respect toward
cadavers. I think any common-sense reading of that standard
refers to a person’s clinical work. It’s not referring to someone
venting about their life experience and bringing in some of their
experience from work, in connection with their venting, in their
private time.192

With this analysis of Tatro in mind, the Article next turns to
another professional standards case involving a very different
factual scenario, namely, the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision in
Oyama v. University of Hawaii.193
B.

Oyama v. University of Hawaii

Unlike Keefe and Tatro, Oyama was not spawned by offcampus Facebook posts replete with references to possible violent
acts. Instead, as one newspaper article observed, “The primary
trouble with Mark Oyama lay in views he had expressed in
academic papers he wrote for education classes.”194
Oyama had completed about one year of coursework in the
University of Hawaii’s Post-Baccalaureate Certificate in
Secondary Education Program when his application to become a

190
Katherine Lymn, Student in Facebook Posts Case Found Dead, MINN. DAILY
(June 27, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.mndaily.com/article/2012/06/student-face
book-posts-case-found-dead; David Hanners, Student Expelled from Brainerd
Nursing School for Facebook Comments Sues, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 16,
2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.twincities.com/2013/02/16/student-expelled-from-brain
erd-nursing-school-for-facebook-comments-sues.
191
Lymn, supra note 190.
192
Jane F. Pribek, Court Backs University of Minnesota Student Sanction,
MINN. L AW. (June 22, 2012), http://minnlawyer.com/2012/06/22/court-backs-universi
ty-of-minnesota-student-sanction.
193
See 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016).
194
D.J. Tice, Liberty Has a Way of Leaving Us Conflicted, STAR T RIB . (Jan. 8,
2016, 6:38 PM), http://www.startribune.com/liberty-has-a-way-of-leaving-us-conflict
ed/364705411.
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student teacher was denied.195 The program’s director, Jeffery
Moniz, told Oyama the denial was based partly on views Oyama
“expressed regarding students with disabilities and the
appropriateness of sexual relations with minors [that] were
deemed not in alignment with standards set by the Hawaii
Department of Education, the National Council for the
Accreditation of Teachers, and the Hawaii Teacher Standards
Board.”196
For instance, Oyama wrote in a paper for his “Educational
Psychology: Adolescence and Education” class:
Personally, I think that online child predation should be legal,
and find it ridiculous that one could be arrested for comments
they make on the Internet. I even think that real life child
predation should be legal, provided that the child is consentual
[sic]. Basically from my point of view, the age of consent should
be either 0, or whatever age a child is when puberty begins.197

Oyama later explained to the course’s professor that he
understood and agreed to comply with a state law requiring him
to report such teacher-student relationships, but that he “still
believed that such a ‘consensual’ relationship was not wrong.”198
In terms of disabled students, Oyama expressed the belief
“that nine of ten special education students he encountered were
‘fakers.’ ”199 He also questioned mainstreaming minors with
learning disabilities into regular classrooms.200
Denying Oyama’s student-teacher application based on such
statements meant he could not teach in Aloha State public
schools on either a half-time or full-time basis. That is because
serving as a student teacher is a requisite step in Hawaii for
obtaining a mandated teacher’s license.201

195
Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., No. 12-00137 HG-BMK, 2013 WL 1767710, at *4–8
(D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2013), aff’d, 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2520 (2016).
196
Id. at *35.
197
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 857.
200
Id. at 856–57.
201
HAW. R EV. STAT. A NN. § 302A-805 (West 2017) (“No person shall serve as a
half-time or full-time teacher in a public school without first having obtained a
license from the board under this subpart.”).
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Oyama sued the University of Hawaii, contending its
“decision to deny his student teaching application violated his
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.”202 Searching for a
rule to resolve that issue, the Ninth Circuit rejected applying all
four of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions affecting the speech
rights of public high school students.203 As Judge Wardlaw wrote
for a unanimous three-judge panel, “[t]his case presents no
occasion to extend student speech doctrine to the university
setting.”204 Wardlaw deemed Hazelwood irrelevant because the
denial of Oyama’s student-teacher application was not based on
pedagogical concerns—the touchstone of the Hazelwood
standard.205 Rather, the refusal pivoted on the University’s
“institutional responsibility”206 to certify that only “students who
meet the standards for the teaching profession”207 are allowed to
be educators in Hawaii’s public schools.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit rejected Mark Oyama’s
argument that his case “was analogous to an employer’s act of
retaliation”208 and should, in turn, be controlled by governmentemployee speech cases such as Pickering v. Board of Education of
Township High School District 205.209
In rebuffing this
assertion, Wardlaw initially noted that Oyama was a student,
not a government employee.210 Additionally, she suggested that
Oyama would be hurting his own free-speech claim if

202

Oyama, 813 F.3d at 860 (emphasis omitted).
E.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
204
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863.
205
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
206
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 864.
209
391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering involved a public school teacher who was fired
after a local newspaper published his letter criticizing the school district’s
superintendent and the board of education over efforts to generate new revenue. Id.
at 564–66. The letter included falsities. Id. at 570–72. However, the United States
Supreme Court emphasized that its subject matter, school funding, was “of
legitimate public concern.” Id. at 571. The Court ultimately ruled for the teacher,
holding that “absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him,
a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.” Id. at 574.
210
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 866.
203
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government-employee speech cases such as Pickering governed
his case. Wardlaw reasoned here that Oyama, as a public
university student:
[E]njoyed greater freedom to test his ideas, critique professional
conventions, and develop into a more mature professional than
he would as a government employee. To hold Oyama to the
same standard as we hold public employees would deprive him
of rights the First Amendment guarantees him as a public
university student.211

After rejecting both the high school student-speech cases and
government-employee decisions as controlling, the Ninth Circuit
fashioned its own test to decide if the University’s denial of Mark
Oyama’s student-teacher application violated his free speech
rights. In doing so, Judge Wardlaw emphasized that Oyama, at
its heart, was a case about certification212 and that courts, in
turn, “generally defer to certification decisions based on defined
professional standards.”213 Wardlaw thus ruled that public
universities may lawfully curb a student’s speech in certification
cases if three steps are satisfied:
1. The decision to deny certification was “directly related to
defined and established professional standards”214 rather than
premised on “officials’ personal disagreement with students’
views.”215 The professional standards cannot be a university’s
own invention. Instead, they must be tethered to “external
guideposts,”216 such as “external standards, regulations, or
statutes governing the profession.”217
2. The decision was narrowly tailored to serve the underlying
purpose or goal of certification for a profession, thus mitigating
the danger that a university “transform[s] its limited discretion
to evaluate a certification candidate’s professional fitness into a
[sic] open-ended license to inhibit the free flow of ideas at public
universities.”218
Narrow tailoring also mandates that the

211

Id.
See id. at 869 (specifying the Ninth Circuit was “focusing on the relationship
between the University’s decision and the standards of the profession in which
Oyama sought certification”).
213
Id. at 867.
214
Id. at 868.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 870.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 871.
212
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statements at issue relate directly to the student’s prospective
profession219 and occur “in the context of the certification
program,”220 rather than “outside this context or communicated
to a broader audience,”221 “such as [at] meetings with other
students or protests to university officials.”222
3. University officials exercised “reasonable professional
judgment”223 in denying certification, giving deference “to the
University’s decision because of its prerogative to evaluate
professional competencies and dispositions . . . .”224 This prong
requires “a reasonable basis”225 to deny certification based on a
breached professional standard, such that not all violations
necessarily provide a reasonable basis for denial.226 Some
infractions, in other words, may be too minor or trivial that their
use to justify certification denial is unreasonable and merely
provides a pretext for crushing speech based on a personal
disagreement with its viewpoint.227
Applying this three-pronged test to the facts in Oyama, the
Ninth Circuit found the first prong was satisfied because the two
criteria on which the University based its decision—one relating
to sexual relationships between adults and minors, the other
pertaining to teaching students with disabilities—were “related
directly to defined and established professional standards.”228
Specifically, the University tied these criteria for certifying
student teachers to multiple external sources, including
“standards established by state and federal law, the Hawaii
Department of Education, the HTSB [Hawaii Teacher Standards

219
See id. at 872 (“[T]he University limited its focus to Oyama’s statements that
directly addressed the roles and responsibilities of aspiring secondary school
teachers.”).
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 876.
224
Id. at 873.
225
Id. at 872.
226
See id. 872–73 (“For example, the statement, ‘I hate cleaning my office’ may
be in tension with a professional standard to ‘keep the office tidy’ but may not be a
reasonable basis to conclude that the speaker is not fit to enter the profession.”).
227
Id.
228
Id. at 868.
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Board], and the University’s national accreditation agency, the
NCATE [National Council for Accreditation of Teacher
Education].”229
As Judge Wardlaw explained, the University “compared
Oyama’s speech not to its own idiosyncratic view of what makes a
good teacher, but rather to external guideposts that establish the
skills and disposition a secondary school teacher must possess.”230
Oyama’s statements demonstrated “that he had not internalized
basic concepts embodied in the relevant external standards—the
nature of sexual predation on children, for example, or the
importance of including and supporting disabled students.”231
In a nutshell, the University of Hawaii adopted benchmarks
and standards for prospective teachers that were already well
established by numerous reputable sources. Oyama’s speech, in
turn, indicated he likely could not meet those benchmarks were
he admitted to the teaching profession. His speech, in other
words, was a legally sufficient indicator or predictor of his future
behavior. As Judge Wardlaw encapsulated this speech-forecastsbehavior logic chain, “[T]he University could look to what Oyama
said as an indication of what he would do once certified.”232
The Ninth Circuit also concluded the University met the
second prong of the test because its basis for denying Oyama’s
student-teacher application was narrowly tailored to evaluating
Oyama’s fitness for his prospective profession.233 Pivotal here
was the court’s determination that the University focused only on
Oyama’s statements that “related directly to his suitability for
teaching.”234
In brief, this prong involved examining the content of
Oyama’s statements that the University relied on in rejecting
him and determining whether that content related directly to his
suitability for teaching. As Judge Wardlaw explained, “rather
than relying on any statement, no matter the subject, as a basis

229
Id. at 870. The author added parenthetical explanations for the abbreviations
in the textual sentence that corresponds with this footnote.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 870–71.
232
Id. at 870 (emphasis in original).
233
Id. at 871–72.
234
Id. at 872.
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for its certification decision, the University limited its focus to
Oyama’s statements that directly addressed the roles and
responsibilities of aspiring secondary school teachers.”235
Intriguingly, the Ninth Circuit suggested that if Oyama had
made the exact same statements in a nonacademic context,236
such as in a Facebook post or at a political rally, his speech might
have been safeguarded by the First Amendment. This, at least,
is one way of interpreting Wardlaw’s observation that:
There is no evidence that the University relied upon any
statements Oyama may have made outside this [academicprogram] context or communicated to a broader audience. Nor
is there any evidence that the University attempted to restrict
or take any adverse action in response to Oyama’s expressive
activities in other campus-related contexts, such as meetings
with other students or protests to university officials. Beyond
the limited context in which Oyama made the statements that
supported the University’s decision, Oyama was free to express
his opinions on any subject he wished.237

Narrow tailoring under the second prong of the Ninth
Circuit’s test thus entails examining two facets of a student’s
statement—its content and the context in which it was
communicated. To uphold a university’s actions against a
student, the content must directly relate to a student’s ability to
satisfy a professional standard, while the context in which that
content is communicated must be within the academic program.
In Oyama, the context factor tilted in favor of the University of
Hawaii because its decision was based “only upon statements
Oyama made in the context of the certification program—in the
classroom, in written assignments, and directly to the instructors
responsible for evaluating his suitability for teaching.”238
Had the appellate courts in either Keefe or Tatro taken the
Ninth Circuit’s context-based approach to narrow tailoring, it is
probable both Craig Keefe and Amanda Tatro would have

235

Id.
Id. Wardlaw emphasized that the statements the University relied on were
made “in the classroom, in written assignments, and directly to the instructors
responsible for evaluating his suitability for teaching.” Id.
237
Id. (emphasis added).
238
Id. (emphasis added).
236
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prevailed. Their speech occurred on Facebook, far beyond the
confines of classroom and laboratories, the pages of a class
assignment, or a one-on-one discussion with a professor.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit turned to the third prong of its
test, concluding the University exercised reasonable professional
judgment in finding Mark Oyama unfit to teach, rather than
reaching its decision based on a personal disagreement with his
views.239
The court was clear that not all violations of
professional standards should be weighted equally and that some
infractions are likely so unimportant as to not justify a
university’s actions against a student.240 Delving into data
regarding teacher-student sexual misconduct, the Ninth Circuit
had no problem finding such misconduct was of serious concern
and that, based on Oyama’s statements, “[T]he University could
reasonably conclude that Oyama would fail to perceive, or to
exercise the vigilance needed to identify and report, potential or
actual sexual abuse of students by other adults.”241 Similarly,
Oyama’s statements regarding students with learning
disabilities were also of serious concern.242
The third factor thus entails analysis of the relative
importance or gravity of a breached professional standard. The
more serious the infraction cited by a university, the more likely
its decision against a student will be upheld as an exercise of
reasonable judgment. On the other hand, the less important the
infraction cited by the university, the more likely its decision
against a student will be struck down as unreasonable, with the
infraction being merely a pretext for obscuring a personal
disagreement with a student’s viewpoint.243 Additionally, the
third prong’s relaxed standard of “reasonable” professional
judgment—rather
than,
say,
“compelling”
professional
239

Id. at 872–74.
See id. at 872 (“[N]ot all inconsistencies between a candidate’s statements
and defined and established professional standards provide a reasonable basis to
conclude that the candidate is not suitable to enter the profession.”).
241
Id. at 873.
242
See id. at 873–74 (“The University could reasonably conclude that a
candidate who expresses his view that special education students are ‘fakers’ to his
professors would lack the professional disposition necessary to identify disabled
students and teach all students, including those with disabilities.”).
243
See id. at 872–73 (noting that in the absence of considering the importance of
the professional standard violated, “the University could use professional standards
as a pretext for decisions based on officials’ personal disagreement with the
candidate’s views”).
240
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judgment—reflects the deference courts grant universities under
the umbrella of institutional academic freedom described earlier
in Part I.244
In summary, “Denying Mark Oyama a teaching career didn’t
violate his free-speech rights because his views evidence[d] an
inability to meet applicable professional standards.”245 The
Ninth Circuit’s tack certainly seems like the most free-speechfriendly approach when considered against Keefe’s deployment of
the vastly deferential Hazelwood test246 and Tatro’s stretching of
its own professional standards test to ensnare the off-campus,
nonacademic forum of Facebook.
As noted above, Judge
Wardlaw indicated that had Mark Oyama’s statements been
made in a nonacademic program context—one outside of the
classroom and not in a response to a class assignment—he likely
would have prevailed on his First Amendment claim.247
Additionally, the fact that the Ninth Circuit considered the
importance of the professional standards at issue and recognized
that not all violations of such standards justify disciplining
students is a minor victory for student free expression.248
But Oyama also has been roundly lambasted. Eric Seitz,
Oyama’s attorney, called it “outrageous” that a student could be
“essentially kicked out of his educational program” based on
“expressions of opinions—however misguided—in a classroom
discussion.”249 UCLA Professor Eugene Volokh laments the
chilling effect he sees the Ninth Circuit’s decision causing,
contending that “[s]mart students will realize, when they hear
about incidents such as Oyama’s, that they had better just avoid
244
Spurgeon, supra note 67. Judge Wardlaw explained this deference-influenced
inquiry by opining that:
[W]e may defer to the University’s decision because of its prerogative to
evaluate professional competencies and dispositions, not because of a blind
faith in the University’s sense of what views are right or wrong. Consistent
with this rationale for deference, we may uphold the University’s decision
only if it reflects reasonable professional judgment about Oyama’s
suitability for teaching.
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 873.
245
Tice, supra note 194.
246
See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text (criticizing the Hazelwood
test).
247
Supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text.
248
Supra note 240 and accompanying text.
249
Associated Press, Hawaii Man’s Opinions on Sex Keep Him from Becoming
Teacher, CBS N EWS (Dec. 29, 2015, 8:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hawaiiman-opinions-on-sex-keep-him-from-becoming-teacher.
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expressing certain views, simply because of the risk that what
happened to Oyama (and others like him) will happen to
them.”250
Referring to Oyama’s remarks questioning the
mainstreaming of students with learning disabilities, Volokh
queries, “Ask yourself: If you were a trainee teacher at the
University of Hawaii, or at other universities, would you express
any doubts to teachers or classmates about the orthodox views on
educating the disabled?”251
With this discussion of Tatro and Oyama in mind, along with
the Introduction’s analysis of Keefe, the Article next proposes and
defends a standard to govern professional-standards cases at
public colleges and universities.
III. STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS:
A PROPOSED TEST FOR PROFESSIONAL-STANDARDS CASES
AFFECTING FREE EXPRESSION AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
Keefe, Tatro, and Oyama illustrate three different
approaches for determining when an external professional
standard violates the First Amendment speech rights of public
university students. But regardless of the test applied—be it the
lax reasonableness standard embodied in Hazelwood and applied
in Keefe to the seemingly more rigorous tack taken in Oyama—
the students nonetheless lost in all three cases.
In fact, the only types of professional-standards cases
students seem to win are those, such as Ward v. Polite252 noted
250
Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Okay To Dismiss Professional School Students for
Expressing ‘Views . . . Deemed Not in Alignment with Standards Set by’ Government
Authorities, WASH. P OST: V OLOKH C ONSPIRACY (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/29/okay-to-dismiss-professionalschool-students-for-expressing-views-deemed-not-in-alignment-with-standards-setby-government-authorities/?utm_term=.c78df7f66b47.
251
Id.
252
667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012). In addition to Ward, another similar case
involving the question of whether a university’s professional standard served merely
as pretext for discriminating against a student’s religious-based First Amendment
freedom is Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). In this case, a
Mormon student asserted a First Amendment right not to be compelled to speak
certain words from a script during an acting training program. Id. at 1281–83. She
found the words offensive, and their utterance would have conflicted with her
religious beliefs. Id. at 1281. In reversing a district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the university, the Tenth Circuit found “there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendants’ justification for the script adherence
requirement was truly pedagogical or whether it was a pretext for religious
discrimination.” Id. at 1293.
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earlier,253 where the very existence of a university policy based on
a professional standard is itself cast into serious doubt, and a
student’s religious beliefs and the expression of them lie in the
balance.254 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit bluntly admonished the University of Eastern Michigan
in Ward, “A university cannot compel a student to alter or violate
her belief systems based on a phantom policy as the price for
obtaining a degree.”255 In brief, a student is likely to prevail only
when it appears that a university cites a possibly nonexistent
professional standard as a pretext for discriminating against that
student’s religious beliefs.256
But that does not help students such as Craig Keefe,
Amanda Tatro, and Mark Oyama. None expressed a religious
belief, and in each of their cases, a professional standard
definitively existed that undergirded an academic program rule
or criterion.
So what rule that balances a university’s institutional
academic freedom with a student’s First Amendment speech
rights should apply in public institution cases such as Keefe,
Tatro, and Oyama? As noted earlier, Hazelwood is criticized for
being far too relaxed of a standard,257 yet it may be the very
“difficulty of identifying alternative doctrine”258 that helps to
“explain the willingness of some courts to apply Hazelwood in the
university context.”259 Unlike in Keefe, the courts in Tatro and
Oyama rejected the high school-grounded Hazelwood test and
instead attempted to fashion alternative doctrines.
253

See supra note 58.
As the appellate court in Ward emphasized, the external ethics code cited by
the university as justification for its discipline of the student actually permitted,
rather than prohibited, that precise action that the student requested. Ward, 667
F.3d at 735.
255
Id. at 738.
256
The Sixth Circuit reasoned here that:
Although the university submits it dismissed Ward from the program
because her request for a referral violated the ACA code of ethics, a
reasonable jury could find otherwise—that the code of ethics contains no
such bar and that the university deployed it as a pretext for punishing
Ward’s religious views and speech.
Id. at 735.
257
See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text.
258
Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, A Close-up, Modern Look at First
Amendment Academic Freedom Rights of Public College Students and Faculty, 101
MINN. L. R EV. 1943, 1952 (2017).
259
Id.
254
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Drawing in part from the logic in Oyama but going beyond it,
this Part proposes and defends a new test. This proffered fourpronged test holds that disciplining a student at either the
undergraduate or graduate level for speech allegedly violating a
professional standard is justified only if all of the following are
met:
1. The Precision Principle. The professional standard,
which must either be codified in a state or federal statute or
carry the imprimatur of at least one leading, national-level
professional trade association or professional interest group,
survives a facial challenge for vagueness;
2. The Essentiality Principle.
Adherence to the
professional standard is essential—not merely useful or simply
helpful—for individual professional success after graduation;
3. The Contextuality Principle.
Imposition of the
professional standard does not place an undue burden on the
free-speech rights of the student in nonprofessional contexts and
nonacademic settings; and
4. The Proportionality Principle. The severity of the
imposed sanction is narrowly limited to encourage future
adherence to the professional standard or, if the discipline is
expulsion or termination from the program, that the student
must have repeatedly engaged in expression indicating, by clear
and convincing evidence, such as a documented prior warning
going unheeded, he or she is unwilling or unable to uphold the
standard.
What are the rationales for this test and each of its four
prongs? The following paragraphs defend the proposed standard
and flesh out some nuances.
Initially, the first prong of the test, the precision
principle, features two facets. The first component requires
judicial scrutiny to ensure that the professional standard cited by
a university, in fact, exists and is widely accepted at a national
level. The standard thus must be embodied either in a state or
federal statute, such as the Minnesota law governing mortuary
professionals in Tatro,260 or be embraced by a national-level
organization such as the American Nurses Association as in

260

MINN. STAT. A NN. § 149A.70 (West 2017).
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Keefe.261 But the mere identification of such a real, well-accepted
professional standard does not end the inquiry under the
precision principle.
The second component of the precision principle delves
deeper into the words comprising the professional standard. This
is especially vital in cases such as Tatro that involve, as one
commentator argues, “vague, subjective, and nearly allinclusive”262 professional standards.
Indeed, the relevant
professional standard in Tatro pivoted on the meaning of the
phrase “dignity and respect.”263 The Minnesota statute governing
the conduct of mortuary professionals from which that phrase
emanates, however, fails to explicate its meaning.264 This is
extremely disconcerting because the words “dignity” and
“respect” have been declared unconstitutionally vague in other
standards-based contexts.265
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Keefe skirted serious issues
of vagueness when it reasoned that the professional standards in
that case were “necessarily quite general.”266 It is one thing for
nonbinding aspirational standards necessarily to be quite
general.267 It is a far different matter, however, to claim that a
legal standard—recall that the aspirational standard in Keefe
took on the same force and effect as a legal benchmark—is
necessarily quite general.268

261

See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.
Ashley C. Johnson, Note, “Narrowly Tailored” and “Directly Related”: How
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Ruling in Tatro v. University of Minnesota Leaves
Post-Secondary Students Powerless to the Often Broad and Indirect Rules of Their
Public Universities, 36 HAMLINE L. R EV. 311, 338 (2013).
263
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Minn. 2012).
264
MINN. STAT. A NN § 149A.70 (West 2017).
265
See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 554–55 (9th Cir. 2004)
(striking down a statute that required physicians to treat patients “with
consideration, respect, and full recognition of the patient’s dignity and individuality”
as unconstitutionally vague, and adding that “understandings of what
‘consideration,’ ‘respect,’ ‘dignity,’ and ‘individuality’ mean are widely variable, and
they are not medical terms of art”) (emphasis added).
266
Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 532 (8th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).
267
Id.
268
Id.
262
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By necessity, a legal standard must not be “quite general.”269
That is because of the dangerous chilling effect and selfcensorship of expression that vague terms cause.270 A statute,
therefore, is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to provide a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited,
or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement.”271 In other words, vague laws pose
two dangers:
They may “lead citizens, seeking to avoid
prosecution but unsure of the prohibition’s scope, to censor their
own speech, forgoing expression the law might plausibly be read
to permit,”272 and they invite “arbitrary and biased
enforcement.”273 The notion of arbitrary and biased enforcement,
of course, taps into concerns about the pretextual use of
professional standards to stifle student expression.274
In summary, the threshold requirement of the test proposed
here—the precision principle—initially requires judicial
identification of a genuine, well-recognized and accepted
professional standard, and then entails examination of that
standard’s terms to ensure they carry clear, precise definitions
that afford students fair notice of their meaning.
Vague
professional standards not only can chill student expression, but
can provide shelter for administrators to abuse their enforcement
in pretextual fashion.
If a university fails to clear the first prong of the proposed
test, then its punishment of a student is rendered
unconstitutional and there is no need to consider the remaining
three requirements. The four-part proposed test, in other words,
requires a university to meet all four prongs before a student’s
discipline is deemed constitutional.

269

Id.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (citing Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)) (observing that “vague laws chill speech”); see also R OBERT
T RAGER ET AL ., T HE L AW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS C OMMUNICATION 5 (5th ed.
2016) (“Vague laws relating to speech are unacceptable because they may chill or
discourage speech by individuals who may choose not to speak rather than risk
running afoul of an unclear law.”).
271
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
272
Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 V ILL. SPORTS & E NT. L.J.
221, 225 (1996).
273
Id.
274
Supra notes 227, 243 and accompanying text.
270
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Assuming, arguendo, that the professional standard a
student allegedly violated passes constitutional muster under the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, the analysis shifts to the
essentiality principle. This prong mandates that compliance
with the professional standard a student purportedly violated is
essential for individual professional success following graduation.
The word “essential” is critical; it means “necessary” and it forces
the judiciary to focus on the relative weight or importance of the
standard in question.
If adherence to the standard is merely useful or helpful for
professional success, rather than necessary, then this fails to
satisfy the essentiality criterion. On the other hand, if violating
a professional standard would subject an individual—after
graduation and once in the profession—to either suspension or
expulsion by a licensing body governing the profession, then
courts should presumptively consider conformance to the
standard to be essential. For nonlicensed professions, such as
journalism, courts should consider, based on expert testimony,
the degree to which failure to adhere to the standard would harm
or jeopardize an individual’s ability to obtain full-time, long-term
employment with well-regarded professional employers. These
suggestions for licensed and nonlicensed professionals add
meaning and teeth to the term essentiality, providing criteria by
which it is measured.
Furthermore, and by way of analogy, the meaning of
“essential” should be considered by courts to be akin to a
“compelling interest”275 used in the strict scrutiny standard of
judicial review that applies to content-based restrictions on
speech.276 A compelling interest is defined, variously, as one of
275
See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (opining that under
strict scrutiny, a statute “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state interest”) (emphasis added).
276
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (noting that
“content-based restrictions on speech” are permissible “only if they survive strict
scrutiny,” and adding that strict scrutiny requires the government to prove that the
regulation in question “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest”) (emphasis added); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.
786, 799 (2011) (asserting that because a California law limiting minors’ access to
violent video games “imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is
invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is,
unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to
serve that interest”) (emphasis added). See generally R. George Wright, Electoral
Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REV. 759, 777 (2012)
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the highest order, an overriding interest and one of unusual
importance.277 This constitutes a higher threshold than the
“significant” governmental interest typically necessary to sustain
a content-neutral statute under intermediate scrutiny.278 As
Professor R. George Wright explains, “In contrast to the most
typical approaches to speech restrictions categorized as contentbased, content-neutral regulations commonly receive less
exacting, less demanding, mid-level judicial scrutiny. There are
certainly variations among the content-neutral test formulations,
but the most broadly applied formulations seem to require a
significant or substantial government interest.”279
The impetus underlying the essentiality principle—that not
all professional standards are of equal importance and that, in
fact, violation of some standards fails, under the First
Amendment, to justify any discipline of a student—reflects the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Oyama. As addressed earlier,280 the
Ninth Circuit opined that:
[N]ot all inconsistencies between a candidate’s statements and
defined and established professional standards provide a
reasonable basis to conclude that the candidate is not suitable
to enter the profession. For example, the statement, “I hate
cleaning my office” may be in tension with a professional
standard to “keep the office tidy” but may not be a reasonable
basis to conclude that the speaker is not fit to enter the
profession.281

Universities, based on the principle of institutional academic
freedom,282 must be given some modest level of deference when
arguing that a professional standard is essential or necessary for
success in a given profession. Courts, however, must scrutinize
whether adherence to the standard, in fact, truly is essential for
success or merely is useful or helpful, with the latter
determination failing to justify discipline. Essentiality also
(identifying strict scrutiny as having “two prongs” and specifying the first prong as
requiring a “compelling government interest” and the second prong as requiring
“sufficiently narrow tailoring”) (emphasis added).
277
See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 287 (3d Cir. 2010).
278
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529.
279
R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech:
A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 F LA. L. R EV. 2081, 2084 (2015)
(footnote omitted).
280
See supra notes 226–227 and accompanying text.
281
Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 872–73 (9th Cir. 2015).
282
See supra Part I (addressing institutional academic freedom).
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guards against the pretextual use of professional standards to
stifle speech. As the Ninth Circuit remarked in Oyama, without
an inquiry into whether adherence to the standard truly makes
one unfit to enter a profession, a university “could use
professional standards as a pretext for decisions based on
officials’ personal disagreement with the candidate’s views.”283
If a university fails to clear the essentiality hurdle, then its
discipline of a student based on speech violates the First
Amendment. But if both the precision and essentiality prongs
are satisfied, then the analysis moves to the contextuality
principle. This factor concentrates on whether the allegedly
offending speech was communicated in an academic or
professional setting, on the one hand, or whether it was
expressed in a nonacademic, nonprofessional venue, such as on
Twitter or Facebook. The Ninth Circuit in Oyama, for example,
took context directly into account.284 As Judge Wardlaw wrote,
“Beyond the limited context in which Oyama made the
statements that supported the University’s decision, Oyama was
free to express his opinions on any subject he wished.”285 The
courts in both Keefe and Tatro, however, stretched the authority
of public universities off campus to the decidedly nonprofessional
and nonacademic setting of Facebook.286
The Hellerstedt majority’s interpretation of the undue
burden standard adds rigor to the test while removing deference
granted to legislative bodies.287 As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky
explains, it requires the judiciary to “carefully scrutinize laws
restricting abortion that are adopted with the purported
justification of protecting women’s health. The majority rejected
judicial deference to legislatures.”288
Furthermore, in
determining if an undue burden exists, “it is for the judiciary to
balance the justifications for the restrictions against their effect
283

Oyama, 813 F.3d at 873.
See supra notes 238 and 247.
285
Oyama, 813 F.3d at 872.
286
See supra notes 13–17 and 131–134 (describing the Facebook posts for which
Craig Keefe and Amanda Tatro were, respectively, disciplined).
287
See Elizabeth Price Foley, Whole Woman’s Health and the Supreme Court’s
Kaleidoscopic Review of Constitutional Rights, 2015–2016 C ATO SUP. C T. R EV. 153,
175 (describing how the majority’s reasoning in Hellerstedt both stripped deference
from the legislature and moved the undue burden standard away from constituting a
rational basis standard of review and closer to a strict scrutiny analysis).
288
Erwin Chemerinsky, Everything Changed: October Term 2015, 19 GREEN
BAG 2d 343, 355 (2016).
284
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on the ability of women to have access to abortions.”289 In other
words, the undue burden test, at least as used by the majority in
Hellerstedt, entails a “balancing burden-benefit analysis.”290
As applied to the First Amendment right of free speech in
professional-standards cases, the undue burden analysis forces
courts not simply to evaluate the benefits that adherence to
professional standards purportedly bring, but also to weigh those
benefits against the burdens imposed on the free-speech rights of
students, especially when they are speaking in nonacademic and
nonprofessional fora.
In considering those burdens, courts
should recognize that: (1) Speech can serve beneficial, personal
interests for students by cathartically relieving stress from the
pressures of academic study, as both Craig Keefe and Amanda
Tatro asserted,291 and (2) Students should have the right to
separate their personal lives from their aspiring professional
ones, such that it unduly burdens their First Amendment rights
to hold them accountable for violating professional standards in
any setting at any time. In brief, the more a university attempts
to extend the reach of professional standards beyond the confines
of classrooms, laboratories, and course-required assignments and
projects, the greater the likelihood is that the burden imposed on
speech is undue.
In a nutshell, a burden levied on speech by a professional
standard might not be considered undue when narrowly confined
to either classroom speech or course-related projects and
assignments. Yet it might be undue when applied to students
who, while off campus, on their own time and using their own
computers, post messages on their personal Twitter accounts.
The deference granted by courts to universities in this balancing
equation, in turn, must decrease when those institutions stretch
the reach of professional standards to extracurricular scenarios.
This is not to say that all applications of professional
standards in off-campus, nonacademic settings are necessarily or
per se undue. Rather, it means that the deference accorded
universities under the concept of institutional academic freedom
289

Id.
Paul Baumgardner & Brian Miller, On Commonsense Inferences and Radical
Indeterminacies: The Murky Future of Abortion Law After Whole Woman’s Health,
67 SYRACUSE L. R EV. 679, 694 (2017).
291
See supra notes 12 and 128–129 (explaining the reasons asserted,
respectively, by Craig Keefe and Amanda Tatro for why they engaged in the speech
that led to their discipline).
290
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must diminish when they choose to apply professional standards
in such venues. Recall that the Hellerstedt majority’s use of the
undue burden standard stripped lawmakers of deference and,
instead, focused more on the actual evidence offered in judicial
settings.292 The same holds true here in the professionalstandards cases.
If a university clears the contextuality prong, then the fourth
part of the proposed test, the proportionality principle, comes
into play.
This principle is premised on the reality that
students—being students, not professionals—will sometimes
make mistakes when they express themselves and that such
blunders, in turn, should presumptively be treated by
universities as teachable moments—opportunities for learning
and improvement, rather than for dismissal or expulsion. Thus,
the proportionality principle requires courts to examine the
nature of the punishment meted out by universities, much as the
Supreme Court of Minnesota did in Tatro.293
Specifically, this prong mandates one of either two things for
the punishment to be constitutional. First, if the sanction is
something less than expulsion or termination, then the sanction’s
severity must be narrowly limited to encourage future adherence
to the professional standard. A stiff penalty, in other words, may
be more discouraging to a student than it is a lesson. Second, if a
university expels or terminates a student—the academic
equivalent of the death penalty—then the student must have
repeatedly engaged in expression indicating, by clear and
convincing evidence, such as a documented prior warning going
unheeded, she is unwilling or unable to uphold the professional
standard were she to graduate. The second facet imposes a clear
and convincing evidentiary standard—a threshold higher than a
mere preponderance of the evidence—given the gravity of the
discipline of expulsion or termination.294 It also requires the

292

Supra notes 287–288 and accompanying text.
See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 524 (Minn. 2012) (noting that
“courts have considered the seriousness of the consequences in analyzing First
Amendment claims,” and pointing out that “Tatro was not expelled or even
suspended from the Mortuary Science Program. The University allowed Tatro to
continue in the Mortuary Science Program with a failing grade in one laboratory
course”).
294
As one article describes it:
The Supreme Court has delineated three standards, or levels, of proof: the
minimum level, preponderance of the evidence, for typical civil cases; the
293
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student to have engaged in the speech on at least more than one
occasion—the use of the term “repeatedly” is key—for expulsion
or termination to be constitutional. In brief, the greater the
penalty, the greater the hurdles a university must clear to
permissibly enforce it.
Only if a public college or university satisfies all four
prongs—precision,
essentiality,
contextuality
and
proportionality—does its use of professional standards to
discipline students for their otherwise First Amendmentprotected speech pass constitutional muster under this proposed
test. Regardless, however, of the actual test or tests that future
courts apply in professional-standards cases, a possibly outcomedeterminative factor in any dispute is the degree of deference the
judiciary extends to universities under the label of institutional
academic freedom.295
The contextuality principle mandates that a university’s
imposition of a professional standard must not place an undue
burden on the free-speech rights of the student in
nonprofessional contexts and nonacademic settings. The undue
burden concept borrows from the Supreme Court’s abortionrestriction jurisprudence and, in particular, from the Court’s
2016 opinion in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.296 Writing
for the five-justice majority, Stephen Breyer observed in Whole
Woman’s Health that an undue burden on the constitutionally
safeguarded right of a woman to have an abortion exists when a
restriction imposes a substantial obstacle.297 Breyer stressed
that the undue burden standard “requires that courts consider
the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer.”298
The standard also places
intermediate level, clear and convincing evidence, for certain civil cases
such as those involving fraud or civil commitment for mental illness; and
the high level for criminal cases, proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Herman N. (Rusty) Johnson, Jr., The Evolving Strong-Basis-in-Evidence Standard,
32 B ERKELEY J. E MP. & L AB. L. 347, 357 (2011).
295
Deference may be defined as “any situation in which a second decisionmaker
is influenced by the judgment of some initial decisionmaker rather than examining
an issue entirely de novo.” Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference
Mistakes, 82 U. C HI . L. R EV . 643, 652 (2015). In the professional-standards cases,
the “second decisionmaker” is a court, while the “initial decisionmaker” is a college
or university.
296
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016).
297
Id. at 2300.
298
Id. at 2309.
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“considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in
judicial proceedings.”299
It is clear, for example, that the
deference afforded the University of Michigan Law School over
its admissions policies in Grutter v. Bollinger300 “performed real
work.”301 As Professor Paul Horwitz writes, “[I]t is hard to
believe that the Court would have left the Law School so free a
hand to shape its admissions policies had it not proceeded from a
posture of deference to university decision making.”302 He adds
that Grutter reveals “the Court stands by its prior statements
singling out universities as institutions uniquely worthy of
substantial deference. Certainly the Law School was accorded
deference far beyond that granted to any other institution whose
affirmative action policies had come before the Court since
Bakke.”303
Analyzing the deference deployed by the Supreme Court in
numerous niches of First Amendment law other than academic
freedom, Professor Clay Calvert and Justin Hayes assert that:
Like a spigot, deference can be turned on and off by the Court,
and even when it is turned on, it can be made either to flow
freely and with full force or it can be reduced to a mere trickle.
It is precisely such subjectivity and flexibility that makes it a
critical concept to understand. Deference amounts to a judicial
wildcard, as it were, that justices can employ . . . .304

In brief, when it comes to institutional academic freedom
and professional-standards cases affecting free speech, courts
should be reticent to grant vast deference to universities lest they
too readily quash students’ First Amendment rights. No matter
how ostensibly rigorous and stringent a legal standard appears
when spelled out on paper, it is in the standard’s courtroom
application where judicial restraint must be exercised in
providing universities with deference to ensure that the rigor and
stringency are more than superficial.
With the proposed four-part test in mind, this Article now
turns to the Conclusion.
299

Id. at 2310.
539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
301
Horwitz, supra note 91, at 496.
302
Id. at 496–97.
303
Id. at 496.
304
Clay Calvert & Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or Not to Defer? Deference and Its
Differential Impact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court, 63 C ASE W.
R ES . L. R EV. 13, 53 (2012).
300
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CONCLUSION
It is time for the United States Supreme Court to hear a case
pitting the First Amendment speech rights of public university
students against the institutional academic freedom of
universities to impose speech-restrictive professional standards
of care. Sadly, the Court passed on such an opportunity in Keefe
by denying a petition for a writ of certiorari in April 2017.305 It
also declined to hear Oyama in June 2016.306 Amanda Tatro, who
was considering petitioning the Court, died before having the
chance to do so.307
Given the regularity with which such cases percolate up
through court systems and the fact that public universities
“increasingly regulate expression protected under the First
Amendment by incorporating regulations developed by third
parties,”308 it is important for the Supreme Court to clarify the
metes and bounds for using professional standards in higher
education when those standards detrimentally impact students’
First Amendment rights.
In a nutshell, citing external
professional standards is, Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea
explains, “[a]n increasingly popular argument for the power of
universities to limit their students’ speech rights . . . .”309
This Article proposed and defended in Part III one possible
test for professional-standards cases that the Supreme Court
might consider if and when it does hear such a case. The
suggested test is tailored to strike a better balance between
universities’ institutional academic freedom and students’ First
Amendment speech rights.
Because the Supreme Court has not embraced a doctrinal
test for resolving professional-standards cases, it seems that a
best practice for all public university programs enforcing such
standards is to provide clear, unambiguous, and written notice to
prospective undergraduate and graduate students regarding how
those standards might detrimentally affect their First
Amendment right of free speech. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly
reasonable that such fair notice be provided to students before
305

Keefe v. Adams, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017).
Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016).
307
Supra notes 187–191 and accompanying text.
308
Andrew R. Kloster, Speech Codes Slipping Past the Schoolhouse Gate:
Current Issues in Students’ Rights, 81 UMKC L. R EV. 617, 628 (2013).
309
Papandrea, supra note 57, at 1853.
306
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they enroll in a degree-granting program, be it undergraduate or
graduate, so that they fully understand the risks of signing away
their constitutional rights and making informed choices when
selecting a major. In fact, a genuinely open and fair process
would mandate that universities specify in writing the precise
professional standards that may eviscerate First Amendment
rights and, in turn, require students to affirmatively sign an
agreement acknowledging they understand these risks. The
principle of notice-and-consent, in brief, is paramount under such
a best-practice scenario.
But how likely is it that a college student will be held to
professional standards that quash free speech rights? One
might, for instance, argue that the cases examined here are
cabined and confined to only students seeking professional
degrees or who study in what the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
Tatro called “a professional program.”310 But as one commentator
rather wryly points out, “[t]hat a student is a professional
student (as opposed to what, we might ask—an ‘academic’ or
even ‘real’ student) would seem to offer a distinction unworthy of
a new exception to First Amendment protections.”311 Indeed, the
scope of the cases examined in this Article readily extends
beyond programs that prepare students for licensed professions.
The following example illustrates exactly this point.
Journalism is a profession but it does not require a government
license or state certification—let alone a college degree in
journalism—to practice in the United States.312 Yet, could a
journalism department enforce the ethical tenets of the Society of
Professional Journalists (“SPJ”)313 against its undergraduate
310

816 N.W.2d 509, 524 (Minn. 2012).
Bush, supra note 54, at 589–90.
312
As Professor Barbie Zelizer explains, “the idea of journalism as a profession
[persists] . . . . Many quarters of the academy readily include the norms, values, and
practices associated with professionalism as part of their curriculum, and concerns
over professionalism remain implicit in much of the journalistic trade literature.”
Barbie Zelizer, Definitions of Journalism, in T HE P RESS 66, 73 (Geneva Overholser
& Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2005). See generally L EE C. B OLLINGER, IMAGES OF
A F REE P RESS 1 (1991) (observing that in the United States, “[t]he press is not
licensed, as it was in seventeenth-century England”); Philip Meyer, Journalism’s
Road to Becoming a Profession, 56 N IEMAN R EPS . 107, 107 (2002) (describing the
qualities that make journalism a profession, and suggesting that “[j]ournalism
education is a form of certification”).
313
See generally Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF
PROF. JOURNALISTS, https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last updated Sept. 6, 2014,
4:49 PM).
311
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majors and, in turn, punish them for their off-campus, Facebookposted speech, akin to the cases of Keefe and Tatro? This may
not be as farfetched as it sounds.
First, the accrediting standards of the Accrediting Council on
Education
in Journalism and Mass Communications
(“ACEJMC”) include a criterion that graduates of ACEJMCaccredited programs should “demonstrate an understanding of
professional ethical principles.”314 More than 100 colleges and
universities are accredited by ACEJMC and thus must adhere to
this criterion.315
Therefore, it is neither unthinkable nor
unreasonable to require journalism majors in these institutions
to sign a statement agreeing to comply with SPJ’s Code of Ethics.
That code provides, in one key part, that “[e]thical
journalism treats sources, subjects, colleagues and members of
the public as human beings deserving of respect.”316 Respect, as
noted earlier, was a central concept underlying the professional
standards in both Keefe317 and Tatro.318
Now imagine an undergraduate journalism major in an
ACEJMC-accredited program at a public university who
interviews a source for a news story for her independent
newspaper319 about a local trailer park that is being razed to
make room for a Whole Foods market. The source is a man with
a sixth-grade education who lives in the trailer park and exists
on welfare and with the assistance of the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program, better known as the food-stamp system.320
During the interview, the source demonstrated poor grammar
and verbal skills and was deemed inarticulate by the studentjournalist.
314
Nine Accrediting Standards, ACCREDITING COUNCIL ON EDUC. IN
JOURNALISM AND MASS COMM., http://www.acejmc.org/policies-process/nine-stand
ards (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (emphasis added).
315
See Accredited/Reaccredited, ACCREDITING COUNCIL ON EDUC. IN
JOURNALISM AND MASS COMM., http://www.acejmc.org/accreditation-reviews/accred
ited-programs/accreditedreaccredited (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (listing the
ACEJMC-accredited institutions).
316
Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, supra note 313 (emphasis
added).
317
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
318
See supra notes 137–139 and accompanying text.
319
The term “independent” is used here to denote that the newspaper is not
sponsored by, advised by, or funded by the college or journalism program.
320
See generally Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplementalnutrition-assistance-program-snap (last updated Jan. 30, 2017).
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Later that night, while at home and using her own computer,
the student-journalist mockingly posts the following to Facebook:
“Just interviewed a total trailer-park trash loooooooooser for a
story today. He’s one dude who definitely won’t be shopping at the
new Whole Foods. Bet he’d spell it Hole Foods! LOL.” The post
is brought to the attention of the chair of the journalism
department. If the journalism department requires students to
comply with SPJ’s Code of Ethics, it would seem—especially
under the logic of either Keefe or Tatro—that the chair could
lawfully discipline the student for her off-campus Facebook post
about the source. That is because the student, in contravention
of the ethical tenet quoted above,321 failed to treat her source as a
human being deserving of respect.
This ethical tenet for professional journalists, when coupled
with ACEJMC’s accrediting standard requiring graduates to
“demonstrate an understanding of professional ethical
principles,”322 suggests a court like that in Keefe, which applied
Hazelwood’s standard, would likely uphold disciplining the
student. Mandating that students adhere to the strictures of
SPJ’s Code of Ethics would seem, per Hazelwood, to be
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”323 The
SPJ provision admonishing that sources be treated with respect
neatly tracks the tenet of the American Nurses Association’s
Code of Ethics at issue in Keefe providing that a nurse treats
colleagues, employees, assistants, and students with respect and
compassion.324
All of this suggests that the impact of cases such as Keefe,
Tatro, and Oyama stretch beyond professions that require
government certification. Business majors, for instance, might
be held to professional ethics standards,325 even though no
professional certification is required to manage or work in a
321

See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
Nine Accrediting Standards, supra note 314.
323
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
324
See A M. N URSES A SS ’N, C ODE OF E THICS FOR N URSES , supra note 6, at 4.
325
The University of Florida’s Warrington College of Businesses houses an
ethics center, which stresses that “business ethics lies at the core of a productive
market system, and that a prosperous and just society presumes that people accept
responsibility and discharge duties, that they honor commitments, that they deal
honestly with others, and that they respect the dignity and integrity of fellow human
beings.” Elizabeth B. & William F. Poe, Sr. Business Ethics Center, U. OF FLA.
WARRINGTON C. OF BUS., http://warrington.ufl.edu/centers/poe (last visited Feb. 4,
2018).
322
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business. Thus, the danger of the professional-standards cases
addressed in this Article may lurk for students studying in any
field that helps to prepare them for a job. Given the potential for
widespread deployment of professional standards across public
university curricula and the threats those standards pose to the
First Amendment freedom of speech, it is time for the nation’s
highest court to weigh in on the issue.

